1 Introduction I present empirical evidence of a robust and signicant negative relation between ownership variables CEO salary, ownership concentration and aggregate female ownership and corporate property insurance use, and thereby apparently I reject the hypothesis that managers' and owners' risk aversion provide incentives to increase corporate hedging policies.
One plausible interpretation of these relations is that rms with high CEO salary, ownership concentration and aggregate female ownership reduce insurance coverage, relative to the average rm, since insurers exercise market power. This interpretation seems plausible since changes in insurance premium and changes in lagged earnings show positive relation in the data.
Small and medium-sized private rms are most sensitive to changes in risk factors such as exchange rates, interest rates and other shocks, for instance catastrophic events or causality losses. Despite the fact that one single event can wipe out a small business and, thus, small rms have stronger incentives to hedge than large rms, empirical work on corporate risk management has basically overlooked small rms. In addition, nearly all of the empirical literature on corporate risk management focuses on derivative use. However, small or private rms are not signicant users of derivatives.
Therefore, I exploit a unique database from an international insurance broker on property insurance purchases by small and medium-sized private Norwegian rms to study insurance use.
1 The insurance data is merged with exceptionally detailed accounting data for these private rms. Signicantly, in Norway, all limited liability rms, listed and private, face an identical accounting and reporting environment. Therefore, the quality of the data is likely high. Further, ownership variables are computed from family relations between two 1 Motives for corporate hedging were initially introduced to justify derivatives use but are often equally valid for insurance use. Note, however, that derivatives can be used to control underinvestment and free cash ow problems (Morellec and Smith (2007) ; Stulz (1990) ) while insurance can control underinvestment problems only. Further, insurance can come with real services through the expertise of insurers in evaluating risks and managing claims settlement procedures (Mayers and Smith (1982) . Derivatives brokers or banks do usually not oer such transfer of expertise through trade or other real services.
individuals, including relationships like sisters, cousins, uncle/aunt and nephew/niece. 2 Importantly, insurance use data oers one crucial advantage over derivative use data, namely, that exposures and the extent of hedging are easy to measure. According to the accounting data, the average value of the insured assets is forty percent of the total assets.
As a result, risk management with insurance is signicant to the survival of the rms in my sample.
A crucial empirical question is whether managers' and owners' risk aversion (Amihud and Lev (1981) , Stulz (1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985) , among others), provide incentives to implement corporate hedging policies. Eectively, the risk aversion hypothesis predicts that ownership variables and the extent of hedging or insurance use are positively related.
However, the empirical evidence on the risk aversion hypothesis is mixed. Indeed, Mayers and Smith (1982) argue that for large corporations with diuse ownership risk aversion as the source of the demand for insurance is largely eliminated. Unlike in public rms, owners of small and medium sized rms have, in general, tied their wealth to the rm. In addition, family rms stress survival and the welfare of stakeholders as important concerns and, thus, need to engage in risk management. A specic version of the risk aversion hypothesis is, therefore, that the predicted positive relation between ownership variables and the extent of insurance use is stronger or more relevant for private rms. I, however, provide empirical evidence of strong, statistically signicant, negative relations between ownership variables CEO salary, ownership concentration and aggregate female ownership and corporate property insurance use in private rms. CEO ownership also shows a negative relation with insurance use. Because CEO ownership substantially reduces sample size, it is excluded from the main analysis. All these relations are inconsistent with the risk aversion hypothesis. I also provide empirical evidence of a positive relation between the number of family owners and insurance use. This relation is also inconsistent with the risk aversion hypothesis since 2 Accounting as well as ownership data from Scandinavia have received increased attention recently. See for example Bennedsen et al. (2007) employing data from Denmark, Sundgren and Wells (1998) studying Finnish rms, and Thorburn (2000) using data from Sweden. For an overview of the accounting and ownership data employed in this study, see Berzins et al. (2008) . the risk aversion motive is expected to diminish in importance as the number of owners, within a family, increases. Importantly, one cannot attribute these relations to an unobservable adverse private rm eect or to some peculiarity of Norwegian corporations since Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) , employing data on U.S. public rms, also nd negative relations between managerial ownership and property insurance coverage and between the share holdings of 5% block owners and property insurance coverage. Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) , however, do not elaborate on or further investigate their counter-intuitive nding.
The above relations between ownership variables and insurance use are consistent with over-insuring by rms with low or below average CEO salary and ownership variables, as well as with self-insurance among CEO or family controlled rms, given insurers exercise market power. Indeed, there exists anecdotal as well as empirical evidence on insurers possessing and exercising market power. Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) , for example, observe increases in property insurance premiums up to 300% within one year. Notably, Dafny (2010) documents that health insurers charge higher premiums to more protable rms. In my sample, I nd that in a regression of changes in premium on a constant, lagged changes in earnings, changes in property, lagged changes in property plus other controls, the coecient on lagged changes in earnings is signicantly positive. The positive relation is consistent with insurers raising property premiums to rms that experience an increase or a series of increases in earnings.
Indeed, changes in earnings together with lagged changes in earnings also show signicantly positive coecient estimates possibly suggesting that insurers extract rents specically by leveraging on earnings persistence.
While the positive relation between the dynamics of earnings and property insurance premium is also consistent with the view that rms raise coverage, and therefore premium, in response to an increase in earnings, it appears controversial whether such a relation is economically sound. Certainly, it is less clear why such a relation should simultaneously imply a negative relation between ownership variables and corporate property insurance use.
Specically, managers' and owners' risk aversion over catastrophic events is unlikely to relate to earnings or protability. In addition, purchasing more coverage or wasting premium even without raising coverage do not appear to be fruitful routes through which managers and owners can misappropriate a rm's surplus. Even in a catastrophic event with a major causality loss there is nothing to be gained for managers and owners since no insurance contract covers the entire loss.
3 In the end, misappropriating a rm's surplus via insurance would require fraud. Even attempted fraud can be ruled out to drive my empirical results since fraud and increases in earnings or protability seem an odd couple. Hence, although I cannot empirically rule out that earnings drives insurance premium, I do rule it out based on lack of incentives for such an economic mechanism.
I analyse insurance use, leverage and liquidity jointly by employing simultaneous-equation regressions. This is an important aspect of corporate insurance, or more generally corporate hedging, as property insurance may allow rms to increase debt capacity. A second reason for why it is important to empirically allow for simultaneity between insurance and debt is that debt contracts frequently stipulate levels of insurance coverage, Smith (1995) . Not surprisingly, I nd that private rms insure to increase their debt capacity. For the rms in my sample, it is also true that the debt ratio exerts a positive inuence on insurance use. These two results show that private rms do not dier from public rms in this respect (Graham and Rogers (2002) and Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) ). Perhaps surprisingly, I nd that insurance use exerts a positive inuence on corporate liquidity. I also nd the converse, that corporate liquidity exerts a positive inuence on insurance use. To my knowledge, this is the rst empirical evidence that insurance and liquidity are complements. The view that cash and insurance are complements is consistent with Rochet and Villeneuve (2011) who prove, in a model where the rm's cash management interacts with Brownian risk (hedged with derivatives) and with Poisson risk (hedged with insurance), that cash-rich rms should 3 Property insurance contracts dene coverage limits per causality and have with annual aggregates. Aggregates may be eliminated at the insurers discretion. If so, the market value of the property is the maximum coverage. Further, even if all losses due to business interruption are insured too it is still expected that some clients move on to competitors since it takes time to rebuild. This time to rebuild risk relating to the customer base prior to a causality loss cannot be entirely insured.
insure but cash-poor rms should not. Lastly, although insurance and cash are complements, rms do not hold cash to increase debt capacity. Cash exerts a negative inuence on longterm debt and long-term debt exerts a negative inuence on cash. Hence, long-term debt or leverage and cash are substitutes.
The last two points are related to Acharya et al. (2007) who argue that cash is held as a hedging instrument rather than as negative debt by nancially constrained rms. They show theoretically and provide empirical evidence supporting the theory that constrained rms with high hedging needs prefer higher cash to lower debt, but rms with low hedging needs prefer lower debt to higher cash. Although the aims of this paper dier from the ones in Acharya et al. (2007) , I nevertheless nd that cash serves two purposes: it is a hedging instrument (complement with insurance), but may also be interpreted as negative debt (substitute for long-term debt). Evidence for the substitutability between cash or liquidity and long-term debt is provided in Opler et al. (1999) ; concretely, they show that rm characteristics known to be empirically associated with low debt are also associated with high cash.
The plan of the paper is as follows: Section 2 contains a brief literature review. Section 3 develops hypotheses regarding managers' and owners' risk aversion. Section 4 describes the data, the explanatory variables used and the motivation for their inclusion. Section 5 contains the main empirical analysis. Section 6 contains empirical evidence on the negative relation between ownership variables and insurance use. Section 7 contains robustness checks, and conclusions are provided in Section 8. Appendix A provides a detailed description of the data, while Appendix B contains sign predictions.
2
Literature Review
This paper relates to four strands of literature. First, in the derivative use literature Tufano (1996) , Schrand and Unal (1998) and Graham and Rogers (2002) nd that hedging increases with managerial share ownership. Second, Tufano (1996) and Haushalter (2000) nd that hedging is decreasing in managerial option ownership. However, it has been argued, Rogers (2002) , that the lack of evidence for the risk aversion motive in previous literature (see Gezcy et al. (1997) Smith (1990) study reinsurance purchases by property/casualty insurance companies. Their evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that risk aversion provides incentives to increase corporate hedging/insurance. Specically, they nd that the less diversied the owners' portfolios, the greater the reinsurance purchases. Market power is likely to be much larger in the reinsurance market than within the insurance industry. Precisely therefore the results of this paper stand not necessarily in contrast to the results in Mayers and Smith (1990) . Specically, if reinsurers extract monopolistic rents from all insurers, they then might not be able to further discriminate against protable insurers.
5 Ehling et al. (2013) employ the data in Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) but use only managerial ownership as explanatory variable. that insurers extract rents from rms.
Third, Vickery (2008) is rst to study risk management practices in private rms by investigating how these rms adjust their interest rate exposure via xed-rate or variablerate loans. He provides evidence for why rms engage in risk management through standard arguments, such as due to nancial constraints, and draws on two surveys. According to Vickery (2008) , owners do not have a signicant eect on the risk management decision.
Specically, Vickery (2008) employs, among other ownership-related variables, the owner's age and the concentration of ownership, but nds no relation. The only evidence supporting the risk aversion motive is that adjustable-rate loans are more common among rms with wealthier owners, which is consistent with the notion that risk aversion is declining with increased wealth. This paper complements Vickery (2008) in that it shows how capital structure and cash policies in private rms relate to the management practices with property insurance. Managers' and Owners' Risk Aversion I test the hypotheses that managers' and owners' risk aversion drive corporate risk management with property insurance. For a given level of risk aversion, the hypothesis implies that 6 Other notable papers addressing corporate liquidity include Kim et al. (1998 ), Opler et al. (1999 , Dittmar et al. (2003) , Almeida et al. (2004) and Faulkender and Wang (2006) . the more a manager or owner is exposed to rm risk the more coverage will be demanded through the rm.
Hypothesis Development
CEO salary and share holdings In untabulated analysis I nd that small rms show higher variability of CEO salary and dividends than large rms in my sample as well as in the population. A likely reason for the high variability of CEO salary and dividends in small private rms is that CEO salary and dividends absorb cash ow shocks. Risk averse managers, however, value smooth salary and payout. In trading o higher premium or even excessive premium versus states of nature with particularly low cash ows, i.e. when there is a severe causality loss and therefore with particularly low salary and payout, risk averse managers with above average exposure to rm risk are expected to purchase above average coverage.
7
Owners I employ ownership concentration, family size and female share holdings to measure various aspects of owners' risk aversion: The higher the ownership concentration the less likely is that owners are well diversied. Therefore, the risk aversion motive to insure predicts a positive relation between coverage or premium and ownership concentration.
Females are often considered to be more risk averse. Overall, the empirical evidence certainly supports this view, Gerdes and Gransmark (2010). Even though, some of the evidence on high risk aversion for females is likely to suer from an endogeneity problem, see for instance Alesina et al. (2013) . One stylized example for how endogeneity aects outcomes that are not related to risk aversion might be a male banker who oers less risky portfolios to female clients because of his misguided perception of higher female risk aversion. Still, there are only few studies that refute the hypothesis that women are more risk averse than 7 Note that both risk aversion channels, salary and share holdings, are self-enforcing. The higher the CEO salary, CEO shareholdings, or both, keeping everything else constant, the more powerful is the CEO relative to other stakeholders. A more powerful CEO will always nd it easier to persuade other stakeholders to purchase more property insurance. men. I, therefore, predict a positive relation between female share holdings and coverage or premium.
Keeping everything the same, the larger a family of owners is the lower is each family members share in a given rm. Lower share holdings increase the likelihood for each family member to have other signicant investments or that they are well diversied. I, therefore, predict a negative relation between family size and coverage or premium.
Controls
Other incentives for corporate hedging or insurance as well as rm characteristics that aect insurance include bondholders motives (Mayers and Smith (1982) , Smith and Stulz (1985) , Shapiro and Titman (1986) , Stulz (1996) , and Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008)), equityholders motives (Main (1983), Smith and Stulz (1985) , and Chen and PonArul (1989)), underinvestment problems (Myers (1977) , Mayers and Smith (1987) , Shapiro and Titman (1986) , Lessard (1990) , Stulz (1990) , and Froot et al. (1993) (2000)). I use standard proxies for these controls. Sign predictions are found at Appendix B.
4
The Data
The insurance data are property insurance contracts between Norwegian private limited liability rms and Aon Grieg, an international insurance broker. Note that, liabilities are not covered by the property insurance contracts. Further, business interruption contracts are separately available and I, therefore, exclude these contracts from the analysis. The original panel data set contains more than 1, 855 rm-year observations, ranging from January, 2003
through May, 2006. The database contains a few listed companies, but the vast majority of the data is for private rms. Therefore, I focus the study on private rms. Each insurance contract is matched with accounting and ownership data from the CCGR database when available.
8 A brief account of the selection and matching procedure is provided in Appendix A. Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of sample rm's property insurance premium data.
Premium is the annual insurance premium in Norwegian Kroner (NOK). The nal sample contains insurance premiums for 933 rms with 1, 855 rm-year observations. The mean (median) for the insurance premium is NOK 192, 432 (45, 848). I follow Mayers and Smith (1982) , Mayers and Smith (1987) , Mayers and Smith (1990) , Yamori (1999) , Hoyt and Kang (2000) and Zou et al. (2003) in interpreting the insurance premium as a proxy for the extent of property coverage. Indeed, Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) argue that their main results are practically unchanged when replacing coverage with premium. The analysis below assumes that the leasing of property, which is unobservable, does not systematically bias insurance coverage.
The insurance ratio, which represents the dependent variable employed in this study, is property insurance scaled by property, plant and equipment plus inventories (PP&E+I).
Because of extreme outliers of the insurance ratio, the smallest and largest one percent are 8 The accounting and ownership database are maintained at the Centre for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR) at BI Norwegian Business School. 9 The USD/NOK exchange rate during the sample period ranges from roughly 6.11 to 7.41 (monthly averages), source: www.norges-bank.no.
excluded from the analysis and from Table 1 . Appendix A contains further information regarding outliers. Table 1 also reports the property insurance premium to dividends and the property insurance premium to earnings ratio. Both measures suggest that corporate spending on insurance premiums to cover losses of property is economically signicant. The value of the insured assets is economically signicant too as the mean of PP&E+I to total assets is greater than thirty percent, reaching forty percent for the subsample with positive long-term debt ratio. This implies that risk management with insurance is signicant to the survival of these rms.
Firms with zero long-term debt are smaller (untabulated) and pay smaller insurance premium than rms with positive long-term debt. Another dierence between the two subsamples in Table 1 , namely the mean of the insurance ratio, which is statistically signicant, may be interpreted as implying that rms with zero long-term debt purchase more insurance per unit of property. This interpretation is plausible since most property insurance contracts cover replacement costs: other rm characteristics, such as rm age or the average age of property, are less likely to cause the higher insurance ratio for rms with zero long-term debt. An alternative and certainly plausible interpretation is that brokers or insurers or both systematically discriminate against smaller rms. Table 2 reports the distribution of sample rms across industries, the number of observations over time, and the percent of rms with negative and positive earnings as well as negative and positive equity. To simplify, I use a one digit industry classication system that relies on 8 industries instead of the standard approach using 10 industries.
10 Firms that are active in multiple industries are assigned to the Multi Group industry.
11 Approximately 10 Of the 1,618 rm-years for which the insurance ratio is available, 299 observations have a missing value for the industry classication code. However, I note that, based on the data available for the period [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] , no rm appears to change the industry classication code in my subsample of the population. Therefore, I ll in missing values with the industry code for the same rm if it is available for at least one year. This results in only 6 cases with missing industry classications for the sample of rms with available insurance ratio.
11 Derivative use work excludes nancial rms from the analysis because hedging and sales of derivatives are indistinguishable and because banks are regulated. Initially, I do not exclude nancial rms since the table shows that almost seven percent of the rm-year observations are from rms with negative equity. Table 2 also shows characteristics for the subsamples of rms with positive long-term debt and for rms with zero long-term debt. Overall, the two subsamples, zero long-term debt versus positive long-term debt, do not dier substantially on the reported characteristics of Table 2 . 12 DIV is dividends scaled by total equity. FAMILYSIZE is number of family owners of the largest family. LTD stands for the book value of long-term debt divided by assets. FEMALE is aggregate female ownership divided by 100. INSTOWN is institutional ownership divided by 100. INTANGASSETS is intangible assets scaled by total assets. OPEX is operating expenses scaled by sales. PP&E is property, plant, and equipment as a percentage of assets. ROA is the return on assets (operating earnings over assets). SALESGROWTH is the three-year moving average percentage growth in sales. SALES denotes the logarithm of sales. SIZE stands for the logarithm of assets.
One can see from Table 3 that rms with zero long-term debt substantially dier from rms with positive long-term debt. For instance, rms with zero long-term debt show a higher mean for CASH, higher mean for CEOSALARY, higher mean for DIV, etc. These rms in my sample do not engage in sales of insurance contracts. In the regressions below, I always exclude the nancial industry dummy and the multi group industry dummy since both have small sample size. In the end, nancial rms show several missing sales data and are, thus, excluded from the reported regressions.
12 The ndings presented below are robust to various other ways (percentage of the largest owner and logarithm of the number of owners) of calculating ownership concentration. dierences between means are highly statistically signicant.
In previous versions of this paper, I employed various other standard corporate nance, risk management or ownership related variables. These variables did not add explanatory power to the regressions or represent an alternative proxy for the same hedging motive.
I
note that several slightly modied regression specications lead to results that are qualitatively similar to the ones presented below.
Untabulated correlation coecients of the explanatory variables, along with the insurance ratio, are low, mostly insignicant, and thus suggest that colinearity problems will not aect the regressions presented below. The only exception is the rather high correlation, 0.7, between SALES and SIZE. As I argue in Section 7, the high correlation between these two rm characteristics raises the hurdle for nding robust evidence for the various hedging theories and therefore does not drive my results.
5
Empirical Findings
In this section, I study whether corporate property insurance purchases of private rms are explained by standard proxies, with focus on proxies for managers' and owners' risk aversion, that aim at measuring corporate nance hedging motives. I further focus on the simultaneity between capital structure, cash, and insurance. I present results of linear GMM simultaneous equations with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent p-values. Variables excluded from the main analysis of the paper include: average family owner size, cash divided by current liabilities, CEO is member of largest family owner dummy, CEO ownership, chair is member of largest family owner dummy, convertible loans divided by the book value of assets, debt equity ratio, direct ownership of all family owners, direct ownership of largest family, dividends per share to earnings per share, logarithm of number of employees, number of seats of largest family owner, regional dummy variables, ultimate ownership of all family owners and ultimate ownership of largest family. Table 4 . These results are inconsistent with the risk aversion motive put forward in Amihud and Lev (1981) , Stulz (1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985) .
The relation between the dividend yield and insurance use is negative and signicant.
This result complements the evidence in Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) on public rms.
They argue that if dividends and free cash ow are positively related, then a rm with high dividends is less likely to fail to rebuild when a casualty loss occurs. This is likely to be true for private rms too. The above relation is also consistent with the view that if dividends are high, then the under-investment problem is small due to the negative relation between dividends and the investment opportunity set (Smith and Watts (1992) ).
According to Grace and Rebello (1993) The negative relation between INSTOWN and INSURANCE, which is insignicant, in Table 4 appears, at rst, to support the informational asymmetry hedging motive. However, it is not clear to whom the rms may signal through insurance. Since private rms rarely 14 Regression specications are adapted to private rms and data availability. attract signicant investments by institutional investors, it is more likely that institutional investors either directly or indirectly inuence the rms in my sample to reduce insurance.
To control for protability, I use ROA. In Table 4 , ROA shows a signicant coecient estimate with negative sign, which is consistent with the sign of DIV. It is also consistent with the view that high dividends imply greater free cash ow and that dividends are typically paid by protable rms.
SIZE shows predicted sign but is insignicant. The insignicant coecient may be caused by the rather small variability of rm size in the data. Recall that the rms in the database need to reach a certain size to justify an insurance broker. This excludes very small rms.
Focusing on rms with positive LTD also removes smaller rms. Since insurance data on listed rms is scarce in my sample (and excluded from the analysis), many large rms were automatically excluded. Hence, the nature of sample rms and the selection procedure reduce cross-sectional variation in rm size relative to the population.
The variable SALESGROWTH, a proxy for growth options, shows a negative sign and is insignicant. This hedging argument is based on the idea that it is optimal for rms with growth options to reduce cash ow variability. Note that Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) argue that insurance only aects cash ow variability indirectly, via the insurance deductible. Since I use insurance premium, which proxies for insurance coverage rather than for the insurance deductible, it appears that the insignicant coecient estimate for SALESGROWTH is plausible.
The simultaneous-equation regressions setting allows for controlling for insurance use due to debt demand. This is an important matter because hedging or insurance allows rms to increase debt capacity. Too, rms with high debt may be contracted with debtors to insure. Indeed, sample rms insure, as suggested by Table 4 , to increase debt capacity. For the rms in my sample, it is also true that the debt ratio exerts a positive inuence on insurance use. This shows that private rms do not dier from public rms in this respect, see Graham and Rogers (2002) for corporate derivative use and Aunon-Nerin and Ehling (2008) for corporate property insurance use. Next, note that INSURANCE exerts a positive inuence on corporate liquidity, CASH. Signicantly, I also nd that the insurance-liquidity relation exists in reverse, in that CASH exerts a positive inuence on INSURANCE. This is the rst evidence that insurance and liquidity, both can be viewed as a form of risk management, are complements. Although insurance and liquidity are complements, rms do not hold cash to increase debt capacity. Specically, Table 4 shows that liquidity exerts a negative inuence on long-term debt, and that long-term debt exerts a negative inuence on liquidity. Therefore, long-term debt and liquidity behave as substitutes.
The view that liquidity serves two purposes, namely to hedge as well as to directly or indirectly reduce debt, is consistent with Acharya et al. (2007) . They argue that cash is held as a hedging instrument rather than as negative debt by nancially constrained rms with high hedging needs. Table 4 . The coecient estimates in the LTD equation, in Table 4 Table 4 . DIV, in Table 4 , is highly signicant and shows a positive sign whereas Bates et al. (2009) predict and nd a negative coecient for the dividend payout dummy variable.
Next, I turn to the LTD and CASH regression results in
To the extent that insurance use, leverage and liquidity are simultaneously determined, these rm policies are likely to be aected by the same explanatory variables. Specically,
R&D expenditures are not available from the CCGR database.
what is the inuence of managerial and owners' risk aversion for leverage and liquidity? The simultaneous-equation regression model in Table 5 re-estimates the model in Table 4 using CONCENTRATION and FEMALE also in the LTD and in the CASH equation.
In Table 5 , the coecients yield slightly dierent results in signicance in comparison to those obtained in Table 4 . CEOSAL is now insignicant and INSTOWN is only slightly insignicant, whereas in Table 4 , INSTOWN shows a p-value of 0.22 in the INSURANCE regression. In the LTD regression, there is almost no change in signicance in comparison to those obtained in Table 4 , except that the p-value of OPEX drops from 0.14 to 0.11.
The coecients in the CASH regression of Table 5 yield identical results in signicance in comparison to those obtained in Table 4 . Note also that there is not one single sign change in Table 5 relative to Table 4 I conclude from this evidence that risk aversion matters for rm policies but often it is hard to detect in the data for instance because other incentives cover it up.
I also study the inuence of family ownership variables. Table 5 .
17
To sum up, the empirical results suggest that corporate insurance use is signicantly aected by ownership structure and the CEO's private motives. However, the coecient estimates show the wrong sign. In addition, private rms insure to increase their long-term debt capacity; insurance and liquidity are complements; and liquidity and long-term debt are substitutes.
6
Explaining the Negative Relation between Ownership
Variables and Insurance
In this section, I present empirical evidence that may explain the strong negative relation between ownership variables CEO salary, ownership concentration and aggregate female ownership and corporate property insurance use.
Dafny (2010) argues that health insurers exploit more protable rms. If this is also a common practice in the property insurance industry, then, on the one hand, it is conceivable that rms with low CEO salary, low ownership concentration or low female ownership ignore or even facilitate monopolistic insurance premium pricing practices. On the other hand, rms with high levels of CEO salary, ownership concentration and female ownership, in one way or another, probably respond to overpriced insurance contracts by cutting back on coverage and thus also on premium. If the motive to cut back on coverage, relative to the coverage that would prevail without insurers trying to exploit protable rms, is marginally stronger in the regressions or in general than the risk aversion hedging motive then we may have an explanation for the negative relation.
17 Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) document a nonlinear relation between ownership and cash holdings using a sample of UK rms. Harford et al. (2008) also document a nonlinear relation between ownership and cash holdings in US rms. In contrast to these studies, I do not nd that there is a nonlinear relation between ownership and cash when replicating their analysis in my linear GMM simultaneous equation regressions. One possible reason for the lack of nonlinearity in my data is the short time series that does not allow to identify such a relation although it might be present. Another reason could be that in private rms the ownership structure does not permit a nonlinear relation between ownership variables and cash.
Results in Table 7 support the view that insurers exploit rms that experience increased earnings. The table contains regressions of changes in premium on a constant, changes in earnings, lagged changes in earnings, both changes in earnings and lagged earnings, changes in PP&E+I and lagged changes in PP&E+I plus year and industry dummy variables. Lagged changes in earnings and both changes in earnings and lagged changes in earnings show signicantly positive coecients, possibly implying that insurers raise property premiums to rms that experience an increase in earnings or a series of increases in earnings.
Of course, an alternative interpretation, which I cannot rule out empirically, is that profitable rms raise coverage or incorporate other, potentially expensive provisions, into their property insurance contracts. Importantly, both interpretations help explain why I nd a strong negative relation between ownership variables CEO salary, ownership concentration and aggregate female ownership and corporate property insurance use. In any case, if protable rms do raise coverage, this practice would be less common among rms with high ownership concentration.
Overall, the evidence in Table 7 supports the view that managers' and owners' risk aversion matter, albeit with a twist: The negative relation between ownership variables and insurance use may be due to rms response to monopolistic insurance premium that is more signicant at rms that have high managers' and owners' risk aversion.
Robustness
The results presented above are robust to various ways of treating outliers. For example, dropping observations of the insurance variable at 5% (on both sides of the distribution), instead of 1%, or keeping outliers of the explanatory variables in the sample, see Appendix A, does not alter the main ndings of this paper.
Next, I address the high correlation between SALES and SIZE. Note that the correlation between these two rm characteristics aects only rst-stage estimates since only one of the two variables appears in the three second-stage regressions. This, however, only raises the hurdle for nding robust that is, signicant evidence for the various hedging theories that are tested for in this paper. Moreover, when I exclude SALES from the rst-stage regressions, I then obtain coecient estimates in the second-stage which are almost identical to the reported results.
The exogenous variables in Tables 4 to 6 are obtained by using data for the scal year-end prior to the start of the insurance contract. First, when the data from the scal year-end after the insurance policy was initiated is used, similar results are obtained.
Second, I also construct an additional sample by selecting stock data from the nancial year before the insurance contract was initiated and ow data from the same year as the insurance contract. This specication assumes that management relies on past stock data but has good estimates available for current ow data. Gezcy et al. (1997) , for example, use this procedure. Overall, I nd that the qualitative results are unaected by changes in the matching and selection criteria between the insurance data and the exogenous variables.
Third, the main qualitative results also hold if the three-year moving average is used instead of the lagged values for the exogenous variables, or if, alternatively, all variables are averaged across all years for which insurance data is available, resulting in a purely cross-sectional model.
To show that the sample is representative, I compare the descriptive statistics of my data to the population for the relevant years. The rms in the Aon Grieg database show somewhat higher sales and size than the average Norwegian private rm. This is, of course, not surprising since smaller rms do not require an insurance broker. Another notable dierence between the sample of rms in the study and the population is that sales growth is lower for rms in this study than in the population, and yet, the median sales growth in my sample and the population are comparable. Overall, I nd that the rms in my sample do not dier in an economically signicant way from the population of private rms in Norway.
Next, I re-estimate the models in Tables 4 to 6 , but include the CEO ownership variable and ll in missing CEO ownership data with zeros.
18 One among the reasons why CEO ownership data is missing is the possibility that CEO ownership is too small to be recorded.
I, therefore, nd it plausible to replace missing data with zero. The results in Tables 4 to   6 are practically unchanged and CEO ownership shows a signicantly negative coecient, which is consistent with the results presented in Section 5.
Finally, the lagged data and the simultaneous-equation regressions reduce biases but likely cannot eliminate them entirely. Indeed, lagging the data only imperfectly reduces the time-series dependency in the explanatory variables. Another potential problem is that property insurance use depends on forecasted rm characteristics. Unfortunately, to suciently address such concerns one would need a much larger sample than I have.
Conclusions
I study corporate risk management with property insurance in private small and mediumsized rms. Risk management in private rms must be signicant since owners, including the CEO, of small and medium-sized rms tie their wealth to the rm at least as tightly as in public rms. Further, it is expected that the risk management motives of owners and managers are much more aligned in small and medium-sized rms than in large public companies. In addition, family rms stress survival and, thus, need to rely on risk management.
I, therefore, predict that the expected positive relation between ownership variables and the extent of insurance use is stronger or more relevant for private rms.
Surprisingly, I document negative relations between the following ownership variables:
CEO salary, ownership concentration and aggregate female ownership and between insurance use. I also document a positive relation between the number of family owners and insurance use. These relations are inconsistent with the risk aversion motive to hedge.
However, the relations are consistent with self-insurance among CEO-controlled rms, rms 18 I have, in addition, hand-collected CEO ownership data via a questionnaire and replaced missing data with zero when industrial ownership equals 100 percent. Nevertheless, the models in Tables 4 to 6 cannot be identied without lling in missing CEO ownership data with zeros.
with high ownership concentrations, rms with above average female owners and rms with a small number of family owners, given monopolistic insurance premiums. I provide empirical evidence that supports this view by showing that insurers raise property insurance premiums for rms that experience increases in earnings.
Moreover, I analyse insurance, capital structure, and liquidity choices jointly by employing simultaneous-equation regressions. The results suggest that private rms insure to increase their debt capacity. The results also suggest that insurance and liquidity are complements. Although insurance and liquidity are complements, rms do not hold cash to increase debt capacity. Specically, I nd that long-term debt and liquidity behave as substitutes.
A Data Description
This appendix contains details about the construction of the variables employed in this study.
A.1 Insurance Data
The data from Aon Grieg are insurance property premiums. The le contains the rm name, gross premium, net premium, and a few other items. The insurance data are merged with the accounting data by matching on the rm name. Firms that cannot be uniquely identied CASH: I eliminate the 6 cases in which CASH is higher than 1. DIV: I allow the dividend-to-equity ratio to be less than 4, removing a total of 18 observations. INTANGASSETS: Negative intangible assets are removed. LTD: I eliminate the 16 observations for which LTD is larger than 3. Cases with longterm debt ratio higher than 1 (but lower than 3) are kept in the sample, to capture the eects of nancial distress.
OPEX: I remove operating expenses to sales ratio at 99 percent as well as negative operating expenses.
ROA: I remove one observation with an ROA of -28. SALES GROWTH: Observations for which the percentage growth in sales in a given year is higher than 10 (1000 percent) are eliminated. This reduces the number of observations of the SALES GROWTH variable by one percent.
B Sign Predictions
This appendix contains the predictions for the variables used in the study. INSURANCE is the insurance premium over property, plant and equipment plus inventories.
B.1 Insurance equation
INTANGASSETS is intangible assets scaled by total assets. LTD stands for book value of long-term debt divided by assets. OPEX is operating expenses scaled by sales. PPE is property, plant, and equipment as a percentage of assets. ROA is the return on assets (operating earnings over assets). SALES is the logarithm of sales. SALESGROWTH is the three-year moving average percentage growth in sales. SIZE is the logarithm of assets.
Industry dummy variables are as in 
